

Color Spectrum of Concepts

The conceptual model of the Color Spectrum of Concepts (CSC) is inspired by Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations, specifically §48 and §53, where he illuminates the dynamics of communication through language-games, within a form of translation. Considering concepts along a color spectrum, pointed to by diverse semiotic signs such as a word in one language and its equivalents in others, CSC facilitates the comparison of intended meanings. This comparison aims to identify common misunderstandings that arise in interlingual interactions and can be regarded as a feasible method for determining appropriate semiotic signs to signify the same concept across diverse languages.

Among concepts argued by Heidegger, Dasein is of great importance. May et al. suggests that the untranslatable essence of Dasein lies in the distinction between the "existence" of inanimate objects as *Vorhandensein* and the "existence" of humans, which Heidegger defines as Dasein (May et al., 1958, p. 118). *Vorhandensein* refers to the existence of *das Vorhandene* (an object that is merely present-at-hand, without the capacity for active engagement), while Dasein, as a "thrown projection" (*geworfener Entwurf*), implies openness to the world and to the entities it encounters, including itself, and projects itself as long as it exists, remaining actively engaged with both the world and itself. "Existence precedes essence," does not seem a suitable slogan for Dasein, whose essence, according to Heidegger (1962, p. 67), lies in its existence. Consequently, "Existential Analysis" does not appear to be an accurate translation for Daseinsanalysis as well.

The word “Dasein” in German is capable to capture the relation of Being to the essence of man in one word. The essence of Dasein which lies in its existence is presented in this German word as being “there” and “just now” while it implies the openness of this Being as a prerequisite for becoming the very Dasein which is on the way.

The word “da” in German is often used to signify a special “place”, “time” or “causality while “sein” could be translated into “being”; but according to Heidegger this very “being” as “there” confronts the world “just now”; consequently, the concept of “Dasein” in German is inseparable from spatiality and temporality while without these two concepts, the concept of “Being” would never be properly understood (Heidegger, 1962). According to Boss (1982), spatiality would be understood just on the basis of temporality (p. 45) and the concept of temporality is closely associated to the concept of “die Zeit” which is introduced by Heidegger as something completely different from the common definition of “time” in English.

The word “time” in English is utilized as an equivalent for “die Zeit” in German while it does not point precisely to the same concept which is signified by the word “die Zeit”. The common concept of the word “time” could be generally asked by “what time is it?” and would be identified by looking at the clock. In this case the meant concept depends on the observer’s particular place on the earth and its temporal position relative to the sun. For every geographic place of observation on the earth, there is a well-defined corresponding time. Accordingly, “time” as a quantitative concept could be considered a function of place but the concept of “die Zeit” seems somehow different.

The concept of “die Zeit” does not refer to the constant clockwise dance of humanmade clock hands on the clock plate. It could be understood completely independent either to the position of observer on the earth or the position of the earth relative to the sun. “Die Zeit” is a qualitative concept which in Heidegger’s *Sein und Zeit* pertains to the unique active constant Being (*das Seiende*) as a quality of “Being” (*das Sein*). In this context, “die Zeit” could be understood as an individual private concept which differs from “Seiendes” to “Seiendes”. The word “Seiendes” as the nominalized present participle from “sein” (to be) is able to refer to a quality of existence which is actively being just there and just now. Heidegger argues that in psychological experimental research, when one measures only the duration of a process the respective “now” refers solely to a specific place of the moving object and is understood as the pure sequence of “nows” (Heidegger, 2001, p. 50).

Just as our *Da* (there) in space must be understood as an *ich* (I), grounded in its specific mode of being (Boss, 1982, p. 43), our *Jetzt* (now) must similarly be understood as an *Ich* (I). *Dasein*, as the present I, perpetually “on the way” toward its own unfolding, can be regarded as the fundamental unit of *die Zeit* for each individual at a given moment. This notion parallels the concept of a second as the base unit of “time” in the International System of Units (SI). Due to the fact that the profound conceptual connection between the German terms *Sein* and *Zeit* does not exist between their English equivalents “Being” and “time,” even the title of Heidegger’s book remains an encoded mystery when translated into English.

The qualitative change, which leads to the sequence of *Daseins*, is itself the result of new encounters based on the *Dasein*’s openness. Accordingly, “die Zeit” could be defined individually

based on the sequence of indefinite Daseins which have been ever experienced under the integrated “I”. One key insight from distinguishing between the concepts signified by “time” and “die Zeit” is that, in trauma, what stands still is not time itself but rather the prolongation of the sequence of being perpetually on the way toward one’s own unfolding, resulting from a procrastination of openness.

Heidegger (1962) believes that “die Zeit” is the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being. The translators, Macquarrie and Robinson footnoted that “horizon” has two quite different meanings in German and English:

Throughout this work the word “horizon” is used with a connotation somewhat different from that to which the English-speaking reader is likely to be accustomed. We tend to think of a horizon as something which we may widen or extend or go beyond; Heidegger, however, seems to think of it rather as something which we can neither widen nor go beyond, but which provides the limits for certain intellectual activities performed “within” it (Heidegger 1962, p. 19).

Some of the ambiguities in the field of Daseinsanalysis are due to such a subtle difference in understanding a concept like “die Zeit” or “horizon” in German and English. Beside the vagueness of the meant concept signified by the word “being”, a “Being” which is limited in the horizon of “die Zeit” could be understood totally different from a “Being” which could be widened or go beyond “time”. Dealing with these conceptual differences among German and English equivalents could inhibit the further incompatibilities in Daseinsanalysis.

The Color Spectrum of Concepts (CSC) is developed as a model for understanding Daseinsanalytic concepts which are originally articulated in German, within the framework of the English language. By employing a topological mapping approach, CSC facilitates the comprehension of daseinsanalytic concepts in the source language, particularly those conveyed through neologisms. In this process, the equivalents in target languages are regarded as signifiers from different linguistic contexts, each attempting to signify the meant concept in the source language as accurately and distinctly as possible.

While concepts can be signified by means of words, accessing them depends on the viability and limitations of each language's vocabulary and grammar. The Color Spectrum of Concepts (CSC) can serve as a model to elucidate daseinsanalytic concepts in various languages, helping to avoid common misconceptions and achieve explicit understanding despite language barriers. Its adaptable design suggests the potential for application across diverse linguistic contexts, inviting further research to explore and extend its utility into other languages.

A subtle affinity between two distinct concepts, one signified by the original word in the source language and the other one signified by its equivalent in the target language, is considered the basis for misunderstanding and misinterpretation according to the Color Spectrum of Concepts. For instance, the German word “das Sein” is argued precisely in *Sein und Zeit* written by Heidegger while translating it and its derived forms in English are an inevitable problem. Comparing two different English translations of a single sentence from *Sein und Zeit* shows the depth of confusion which could occur in conceptualizing such a main daseinsanalytic concept in

another languages. A sentence from Martin Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* is cited respectively from Stambaugh's and from Macquarrie & Robinson's translations:

The being which this being is concerned about in its being is always my own (Heidegger, 1996, page 40).

That Being which is an issue for this entity in its very Being, is in each case mine (Heidegger, 1962, Page 67).

The confusion about the signified concept by the word "being", is clearly explained by Macquarrie & Robinson:

Heidegger translates Plato's present participle ὄν by this present participle of the verb "sein" (to be). We accordingly translate "seiend" here and in a number of later passages by the present participle "being"; where such a translation is inconvenient, we shall resort to other constructions, usually subjoining the German word in brackets or in a footnote. The participle "seiend" must be distinguished from the infinitive "sein", which we shall usually translate either by the infinitive "to be" or by the gerund "being". It must also be distinguished from the important substantive "Sein" (always capitalized), which we shall translate as "Being" (capitalized), and from the equally important substantive "Seiendes", which is directly derived from "seiend", and which we shall usually translate as "entity" or "entities" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 19).

Signifying certain concepts in English, such as the one referred to by the German word *Seiendes*, is challenging. The term *diesem Seienden* in the German original sentence, as a substantive of the verb *sein* (to be), refers to aspects of Being (as defined by

Macquarrie and Robinson as an equivalent for *das Sein*), being, entity, and the objectivity, interpreted from its role (as a dative) in the sentence. Each of these aspects can be visualized in varying tonalities along the color spectrum of concepts, where their semantic proximity becomes evident through the gradual merging of tones, despite their conceptual distinctiveness. This nuanced interplay of meanings underscores how the term *diesem Seienden* transcends any single equivalent in English capable of signifying the same concept.

Accordingly, the term *diesem Seienden* in the German sentence distinguishes existence as a way of being from the one who exists, referred to as *das Seiende*. The reader is invited to understand *das Seiende* as an entity that is actively being (existing) and capable of encountering its own Being (*das Sein*). This kind of Being (*das Sein*), which can be encountered by *das Seiende*, is in essence distinct from the existence of an entity as a mere object. Due to the grammatical limitation, none of the translators could create a substantive like “*das Seiende*” out of the verb “to be”. The term “entity” does not adequately signify the intended concept, as it refers to something merely present and objectively perceivable.

In the mentioned sentences, translated by Macquarrie & Robinson, “entity”, “being”, “Being”, and “*das Seiende*” in spite of subtle differences signify concepts which are similar. The subtle affinity between these concepts serves as the foundation for misunderstanding and misinterpretation. This similarity leads to their topological place on the proposed color spectrum being close to each other, for instance, somewhere between azure and violet. Since some concepts could slightly differ even for two people who speak the same language, the signified zone for each one is assumed blurred and hazy in outline.




Figure 1: *das Seiende, entity, Being and being*

Every ellipse in the picture represents the approximate realm of the concept signified by a word in the translations from this sentence: “Das Sein, darum es diesem Seienden in seinem Sein geht, ist je meines (Heidegger, 1967, p. 42)”. The German term “das Seiende,” represented by red dotting somewhere near these three closely related concepts on the color spectrum of concepts, with no accurate equivalent in English, represent the challenge of conveying nuanced meanings across languages, especially when terms are deeply embedded in the linguistic and cultural frameworks of their origins.

These conceptual spaces may lack precise counterparts in the target language, as the so-called “equivalents” typically refer to the vicinity of the intended conceptual space without fully coinciding with it. Such terms, which serve as approximate markers and signify only partial facets of the source concept while falling short of conveying its full semantic scope, can hardly be regarded as accurate equivalents.

By recognizing and analyzing the combination of these approximations, one can begin to triangulate the conceptual “region” intended by the original term. This approach requires a nuanced understanding of the linguistic, cultural, and semantic dimensions of both the source and target languages. Such an analytical process not only facilitates a more accurate interpretation of the original concept but also paves the way for identifying or crafting terms in the target language that resonate more closely with the intended meaning. This methodology underscores the importance of a systematic hermeneutic model for bridging linguistic and cultural divides, thereby enriching interlingual communication and understanding.

Reading, thinking and writing in the realm of Daseinsanalysis leads each language to keep its dwellers in touch with different concepts which could mistakenly be assumed the same. It seems like living in different parallel worlds without knowing about it. Some concepts, for instance, “das Seiende” or “das Dasein”, which have been signified in a language like German, have no accurate equivalents in other languages for example in English and subsequently could be hardly signified precisely in that language. However, considering their place topologically on the color spectrum of concepts and defining them distinctively in German and English by the authors could help us to overcome these language barriers.

Based on definitions, when the concept of “being” is considered from the range of violet to indigo and the concept of “entity” from the range of indigo to green, then the concept of “Being” (das Sein) contains a part of both. In this case, the concept of “diesem Seienden”¹⁰ would be somewhere on this color spectrum which contains a bit of each of them but still

¹⁰ The term „diesem Seienden“ in the German sentence is an inflected form of „das Seiende“, the concept of which is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.

represents something different on its own. For such a special zone on the Color Spectrum of Concepts, which is dotted on the picture, proposing a new word according to the grammatical rules of the target language is proposed.

Correspondingly, “Dasein”’s place on the Color Spectrum of Concepts is where the concept of “da” ends and the concept of “sein” begins. The word “da” in German is a joint point which is able to temporalize the space while spatializing the time. The extent of the common ground between “da” and the proposed equivalent “there” is not wide enough that they could be considered equivalents due to the fact that the word “there” is able to point to a place, but it could not refer to time. Signifying the concept of “Dasein” in English entails considering its place on the CSC and the attributes of this place.




Figure 2: *das Seiende, das Sein (Being), da, die Zeit, der Raum*

Exchanging daseinsanalytic explications within different languages would be facilitated by considering concepts as topoi on a color spectrum. Comparing the two topological semantic mappings of the meant concepts, one signified in

the source language with the other one which the so-called equivalent signifies in the target language, reveals the probable subtle existing difference between them and could clear up the common misunderstandings.

According to the topological semantic mapping model employed in the Color Spectrum of Concepts, the comprehension of daseinsanalytic concepts, originally signified in German, may encounter even more challenges in identifying accurate and precise equivalents in the target languages when translated from English. A more significant issue arises in the translation of English versions derived from the original German resources into other languages. In such cases, there is a potential lack of overlap between the concept signified in the target language and the intended concept in the original German text.

This lack of overlap reveals that the shared components between the concept signified by the target language and the one signified by the English equivalent might be entirely distinct from the components that the English and German words signify on the topological semantic mapping. This intricate linguistic nuance underscores the complexity and the high potential for misunderstanding in conveying daseinsanalytic concepts when translating from languages other than German. Using German as the sole source language to understand Daseinsanalysis is highly recommended in this study.

According to this topological semantic mapping, various concepts are signified by words which come out of different languages while no known accurate equivalent might be found in the target language for a word that signifies a particular concept in the source language. Considering the limitations

of languages in exchanging daseinsanalytic concepts between German and English was a prerequisite for the author to get close to the concept of Daseinsanalysis; however, in 3.323 Wittgenstein (2002) mentions the different modes of signification for a single word in everyday language which could differ for various people, even for those who speak the same language.

Our perceptions are related with the world while they are completely separated from the world itself. All the things which we talk and all the concepts that we think about, are the outcomes of our Being-in-the-world, but beside the language barriers are limited to our own individual observations and perceptions. According to CSC, concepts are relatively and potentially accessible for all the languages but the extent of this accessibility depends on each language's current vocabulary and grammatical rules. Translating could be considered as a tool to detect the extent of the common ground between the two signified concepts by the two so-called equivalents in the source and target languages. Based on this hypothesis, CSC facilitates defining those daseinsanalytic concepts which are relatively hard to be caught up with in the target language but is not able to detect the distinction between individual observations and perceptions. Equivalents are examples of different words which relatively more or less try to point to the same concepts. Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigation* §109 mentions:

There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its power of illumination – i.e. its purpose – from the philosophical problems. These are, of course, not empirical

problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize those workings: in despite of an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language (Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 47).

Being (das Sein) seems like a mirror broken down into more than 7000¹¹ pieces, each language takes a piece, looks into it and calls out its own recognition as *Being*. Piecing these reflections back together could lead to an integrated understanding up from *Being* and overcoming the bewitchment of our intelligence by languages. Heidegger mentioned that to name is fundamentally to call and what is called, appears as what is present (Heidegger, 1962, p. 120). It sounds that we dwell within the call of Being by virtue of our languages through which we encounter whatever, we disclose ourselves or we may be called by ourselves from afar unto afar.

11 There are approximately 7,000 languages in the world, and the mentioned allegory finds its roots in an ancient Persian tale: Truth was a mirror in God's hand, in which He admired His beauty. The mirror slipped from His grasp and shattered upon the earth, scattering fragments far and wide. Everybody took one of these pieces, gazing into it and believing they held the entirety of Truth. Yet, in its infinite splendor, Truth was dispersed among all.