Issue 4 Vol. 39 1997

On the functional architecture of volitional action: Integration of cognitive, motivational, and neuropsychological perspectives

GOSCHKE, T.

Two fundamental problems of theories of volitional control are discussed. The first problem relates to the widespread assumption of a central executive serving the function to coordinate the operations of cognitive subsystems according to a current intention. Experimental and neuropsychological findings are reviewed suggesting that the central executive is neither functionally nor neuroanatomically an unitary system, but that different executive functions are mediated by separable subsystems. The second problem relates to the assumption (formulated in various theories of volitional action) that volitional processes serve he function to shield intentions against distractions or temptations. I discuss how the postulated "shielding” of intentions can be reconciled with the necessity to switch from one intention or action to another, if this is demanded by situational or motivational factors. A functional analysis of adaptive requirements of action control leads to the formulation of a number of basic control dilemmata. This analysis suggests a conceptualization of action control as an optimization problem in which multiple, partially incompatible constraints must be satisfied. On this background I present an alternative theoretical framework according to which volitional action is not controlled by a central executive, but results from the interaction of specialized subsystems competing for access to a global working memory. Finally I sketch some perspectives as to how motivational, cognitive, and personality approaches may be integrated within this framework.

Keywords: will, volition, action control, cognitive control, central executive

Short Title: Goschke, T. (1997) PsyBeit 4:375

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