The neuro-physiological counterpart is called “feature binding” (Van der Malsburg, Singer and Gray). It consists in the synchronization of the electrical spikes travelling in the neurons of different brain areas which cooperate to the same global perception, and such a synchronization implies the re-adjustment of the individual neuron thresholds. This is done through signals flowing top-down from the semantic memory to the higher cortical stages in order to match inputs arriving bottom-up from the peripheral cortical stages directly connected to the sensor terminals. If the matching is not reached, this denotes a novel experience which must be categorized as a new feature previously absent in the semantic memory. Besides being a sound conjecture called ART=Adaptive Resonance Theory (Grossberg), this type of learning has indirect confirmation in the experimental evidence of the anatomical growth of new synaptic connections even in aged individuals.
In Sec. 2 and 3 I show how the Cartesian cut between res cogitans and extensa is equivalent to a simplified model of the knowledge procedure which would then be unable to cope with complex situations. To deal with complexity, any cognitive agent recurs to adaptive strategies which uncover an ontological foundation of our knowledge acts (Sec. 4). In Sec. 5, I review the recent approaches to visual perception, in terms of “feature binding” and ART, which are the physiological correlate of the adaptive strategy discussed in Sec. 4 for model building. Combining Secs. 4 and 5 we see that both cognitive endeavors of a human being, namely, the extraction of coherent perceptions out of sense stimuli and the successive organization of perceptions into models of reality, result from a trade off between categories already stored in a semantic memory and the continuous modifications induced by the in-flow of novel features.
In Sec. 6 we speak of an open science, that is, a science not closed in a self-referential way as Hofstadter’s machine. This aperture implies the reality of universals.
Within a reductionistic framework, the collective terms, such as “wood” to denote many close by trees or “flock” to denote many animals with correlated behaviors, seem purely linguistic connotations. However the mutual relations among individuals create a novel unity which would not exist if we were just dealing with sets of uncorrelated objects. I here report some statements about this question (Armstrong).
It is argued, first, that there are universals, both monadic and polyadic,
that is, properties and relations, which exist independently of the
classifying mind. Realist is thus accepted, nominalism rejected. Second,
it is argued that no monadic universal is found except as a property of
some particular, and no polyadic universal except as a relation holding
between particulars. Transcendent or Platonic realism is thus rejected.
Third, it is argued that what universals there are is not to be determined
simply by considering what predicates can be applied to particulars.
Instead, it is the task of total science, conceived of as total enquiry,
to determine what universals there are. The view defended is therefore a
scientific realism about universals. It might also be called a
posteriori realism…….
Contemporary philosophy recognizes two main lines of argument for the
existence of objective universals. The first is, or is a descendant of,
Plato’s One over Many argument. Its premiss is that many different
particulars can all have what appears to be the same nature. In the terms
used by C.S. Peirce, different tokens may all be of the same type. The
conclusion of the argument is simply that in general this appearance
cannot be explained away, but must be accepted.….
….with the exception of a suggestive paper by Hilary Putnam (1970: On
Properties, in “Essays in Honour of C.G. Hampel”, Reprinted in
Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1, Cambridge University Press) contemporary
philosophers, at least, have largely ignored the possibility of developing
a theory of objective universals, where the particular universals admitted
are determined on the basis of scientific rather than semantic
considerations. It might perhaps be argued that Plato in his later works,
Aristotle and the Scholastic Realists were ahead of contemporary
philosophy in this matter, although handicapped by the relative
backwardness of the science and the scientific methodology of their day.
My contention is that, by accepting this a posteriori Realism, the theory
of universals, arguably the central problem of ontology, can be placed on
a securer and more intelligible foundation that anything previously
available. In particular, such a doctrine makes possible the
reconciliation of an empiricist epistemology, which I wish to retain, with
ontological realism about universals.
